Fermilab Computing Division

Fermilab PKI Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Statement

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INTRODUCTION

Overview

This document follows the structure suggested in RFC 2527.

The public key infrastructure of Fermilab consists of the Kerberos Certificate Authority (KCA). The KCA is a replicated online service that issues short-lived certificates based on presentation of a Kerberos-authenticated request.

Identification

Document title
Fermilab PKI Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Statement
Document version
Revision: 1.4
Document date
Date: October 2005
OID
1.3.6.1.4.1.14147.1.5.1.SC 2

Community and Applicability

This document describes the policies and operation of an infrastructure which will be termed the ``Fermilab PKI.''

Certification Authorities

The keys that the Fermilab Kerberos CA certifies are valid for Digital Signature, Certificate Signing, and CRL Signing.

Registration Authorities

There are three categories of users: employees, visitors and contractors, each registered by a different authority within Fermilab. Employees are registered by Fermilab Personnel Department, visitors by the Users Office and contractors by the Procurement Office. In all cases, approval of the individuals' identity information and legitimate connection with Fermilab is performed. These registration authorities enroll people into a common registry, making them ``Fermilab Users'' and eligible for certification.

End Entities

The KCA issues certificates to Fermilab Users and to automated processes acting for users or services at their instigation. The keys it certifies are valid for Digitial Signature and Key Encipherment. Its certificates are intended for use with Grid and Web applications.

Contact Details

The Fermilab PKI is extablished, maintained and operated by the Fermilab Computer Security Team. The contact person for this document is:

Frank J. Nagy
Fermilab MS-368
PO Box 500
Batavia IL 60510
USA

Phone: +1 630 840 4935
Fax: +1 630 840 8208
Email: nightwatch@fnal.gov

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Obligations

CA Obligations

The Fermilab PKI will:

  • Accept service certificate requests and revocation requests from Fermilab authorized system and application maintainers; notify such requesters of issued and revoked certificates.
  • Accept Kerberos-authenticated requests for user certificates from Fermilab employees, subcontractors, and visitors, or processes initiated by them.
  • Publish CRLs in a timely manner and in well-known locations.
  • Protect and, when necessary or prudent, replace CA private keys.

RA Obligations

RAs are not involved in the handling or verification of cryptographic keys. They are responsible only for verifying the identities and roles of users and either issuing a physical identification card or establishing a trusted contact path to a Visitor through a Fermilab division or section head or a spokeperson of a Fermilab experiment.

Subscriber Obligations

Subscribers must:

  • Make only accurate representations in requests for certificates.
  • Exercise all reasonable care in protecting the private keys corresponding to their certificates, including but not limited to
    never storing them on a networked file system or otherwise transmitting them over a network.
  • Ensure that the private keys corresponding to their issued service certificates are stored in a manner that minimizes the risk of exposure.
  • Observe restrictions on private key and certificate use.
  • Promptly notify the CA operators of any incident involving a possibility of exposure of a private key.

Relying Party Obligations

Relying parties must:

  • Be cognizant of the provisions of this document.
  • Verify any self-signed certificates to their own satisfaction using out-of-band means.
  • Accept responsibility for checking any relevant CRLs before accepting the validity of a certificate.
  • Observe restrictions on private key and certificate use.
  • Not presume any authorization of an end entity based on possession of a certificate from the Fermilab PKI or its corresponding private key.

Liability

The Fermilab PKI is operated substantially in accordance with Fermilab's own risk analysis. No liability, explicit or implicit, is accepted.

The Fermilab PKI and its agents make no guarantee about the security or suitability of a service that is identified by a Fermilab certificate. The certification service is run with a reasonable level of security, but it is provided on a best effort only basis. It does not warrant its procedures and it will take no responsibility for problems arising from its operation, or for the use made of the certificates it provides.

The Fermilab PKI denies any financial or any other kind of responsibility for damages or impairments resulting from its operation.

Financial Responsibility

No financial responsibility is accepted.

Interpretation and Enforcement

This policy is subordinate to all applicable U.S. government laws, as well as Department of Energy (DOE) orders.

Fees

No fees are charged.

Publication and Repositories

Publication of CA information

The Fermilab PKI will operate an online repository that contains:

  • Fermilab CA certificates.
  • Certificate Revocation Lists.
  • A copy of this policy.
  • Other information deemed relevant to the Fermilab PKI.

Frequency of Publication

  • CA certificates will be published in the repository as soon as they are issued.
  • CRLs will be published as soon as they are updated.
  • Fermilab PKI documents will be published in the repository as they are approved.

Access Controls

The CA publication repository is always available, outside of maintenance times and unforeseen failures.

The Fermilab PKI imposes no restrictions on the accessibility of published information.

Repository Location

http://security.fnal.gov/pki/ -- check URL

Compliance Audit

The Fermilab PKI will not be audited by an outside party. Certifying, cross-certifying, and relying organizations may request a review of Fermilab PKI operation.

Confidentiality Policy

The Fermilab PKI does not have access to subscribers' private keys. It considers the contents of CRLs and certificates, including subscribers' names and Fermilab userids, to be public information. For identification of authorized users, it may rely on other organizations within Fermilab, some of which may have private information. If so, the Fermilab PKI does not obtain or store copies of such private information.

Intellectual Property Rights

The Fermilab PKI asserts no ownership rights in certificates issued to subscribers. No claims are made regarding documents produced by the Fermilab CA other than as specified in Fermilab's operating contract with the U.S. Department of Energy. Acknowledgment is hereby given to the DOE Science Grid and to the CERN Certification Authority for inspiration of parts of this document.

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

Initial Registration

Types of Names

Subject distinguished names are X.500 names, with components varying depending on the type of certificate. Certificates issued by the KCA will include as a Subject Alternative Name the Kerberos principal name which was authenticated for issuance of the certificate.

All subject distinguished names in certificates issued by the Fermilab PKI begin with ``DC=gov, DC=fnal, O=Fermilab''. The next
component will be one of:

OU=Certificate Authorities
for a CA's certificate. A CN component will follow the OU, naming the CA, for the KCA this will be "Kerberized CA".
OU=People
for a user's certificate, issued by the KCA. A CN component will follow containing the user's full name, after which will appear a UID component containing the user's Fermilab computer account name.
OU=Robots
for a certificate issued by the KCA to an automated process acting at the instigation of a user. This is usually followed by a CN component naming the automata; this is "cron" for standard cron jobs. If the process is acting for a specific user, the user's full name and UID follow as above.

Name Meanings

The CN component of the subject name in user certificates has no semantic significance, but should have a reasonable association with the name of the user.

Name Interpretation

The subject DN of user certificates will contain OU=People. CA Certificates will contain OU=Certificate Authorities.

Name Uniqueness

Each subject name certified by the Fermilab PKI will be unique. User certificates include the Fermilab-assigned account name of the user, which disambiguate any similar or identical common names.

Name Disputes

The Fermilab PKI will resolve disputes as it sees fit.

Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

No stipulation.

Authentication of Individual Identity

User identity will be authenticated by the KCA through Kerberos 5 credentials. Requests for service certificates must come from a valid Fermilab User and will be checked against registered system administrator information.

Rekeying

Every user certificate request is treated as an initial registration. Subsequent Service and CA certificate requests also follow the same respective validation steps as initial requests.

Revocation Requests

User certificates, having short lifetimes, will normally not be revoked. CA and special certificates will only be revoked at the instigation of Fermilab computer security personnel.

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Certificate Application

Users apply for user certificates from the KCA using a Kerberos-authenticated protocol. Valid CA and special certificate requests can only come from Fermilab computer security personnel.

Certificate Issuance

User certificates are issued immediately to the user upon successful execution of the Kerberos certificate request protocol. CA and special certificates are issued only to Fermilab computer security personnel.

Certificate Acceptance

No stipulation.

Certificate Suspension and Revocation

Certificates issued by the Fermilab PKI will not be suspended.

Circumstances for Revocation

User certificates, because of their short lifetimes, will not normally revoked. CA and special certificates will be revoked in any of the following circumstances.

  • The private key is suspected or reported to be lost or exposed.
  • The information in the certificate is believed to be, or to have become inaccurate.
  • The certificate is reported to no longer be needed.
  • A new certificate with the same Subject DN is to be issued.

Requesting Revocation

Fermilab computer security personnel may request revocation of a CA or special certificate.

Verifying Revocation Requests.

A revocation request signed with the private key of the affected certificate is always valid. Other revocation requests are subject to the same verification procedures as a corresponding certificate request.

CRL Issuance Frequency

The CRL for the Kerberos CA will be issued upon any change in its contents. Normally the Kerberos CA's CRL will be empty.

Online Revocation/Status Checking Availability

The most recent CRL will be available online.

Revocation/Status Checking Requirements

Relying parties are advised to obtain and consult a valid CRL.

Security Audit Procedures

No stipulation.

Records Archival

No stipulation.

Key Changeover

The community of known relying parties will be notified of any new CA public key, and they may then obtain it in the same manner as the previous CA certificates. KCA keys will be changed only at long intervals, unless lost or compromised.

Compromise and Disaster Recovery

The KCA is a replicated service, so if one instance is corrupted but uncompromised it will be restored using data from another instance.

If a KCA instance is compromised or corrupted, its certificate must be revoked and a new key generated. This information will be disseminated to subscribers and known relying parties.

CA Termination

When the Fermilab PKI terminates its services the fact will be advertised, particularly to users and known relying parties. All valid CA certificates will be revoked and the final CRLs will be offered for storage at some willing facility.

PHYSICAL, PROCEDURAL, AND PERSONNEL SECURITY CONTROLS

Physical Security Controls

The KCA hosts are Sun Solaris servers located in keycard-controlled computer rooms where all occupants are required to wear Fermilab ID cards or be accompanied. They run no extraneous network services and are kept current with respect to relevant security patches. Login access is subject to Kerberos authentication and permitted only for principals assigned to computer security professionals.

Procedural Controls

No stipulation.

Personnel Security Controls

All persons with access to the KCA's secret key will be full-time Fermilab employees in the computer security organization.

TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS


Key Pair Generation and Installation


Private Key Generation

The Fermilab PKI does not generate any private keys but its own. KCA keys are generated on the systems where they will be used, and the Certificate Signing Requests will be transported on removable media.

User private keys will be generated by KCA client software on the host where they will be stored. They will be stored on non-networked filesystems. They will normally be stored in the clear, but the lifetimes of the associated public-key certificates is limited to the lifetime of the Kerberos credentials used to obtain them, which is currently no more than 26 hours.

Private Key Delivery to Entity

Not necessary.

Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

User public keys are delivered under Kerberos authentication and integrity protection.

CA Public Key Delivery to Users

The public key of the KCA is delivered to subscribers and potential relying parties through publication and other unauthenticated channels (except where a secured infrastructure such as PGP or CA cross-certification may already exist) and must be verified through non-digital means to the satisfaction of each relying party.

Key Sizes

Public RSA keys shorter than 512 bits will not be signed. Public RSA keys shorter than 1024 bits will not be certified for a period longer than seven days.

Key Usage

The Fermilab PKI does not enforce key usage restrictions by any means beyond the X.509v3 extensions in the certificates it issues. In User and Service certificates, those extensions will mark the associated keys as valid for Digital Signature and Key Encipherment. CA certificates will have the Key Usage extension set to allow Digital Signature, Certificate Signing, and CRL Signing.

Certificates issued by the Fermilab PKI are not recommended to be used for non-repudiation, data confidentiality or message integrity.

Private Key Protection

Key Generation Modules

No stipulation

Multiperson Control

No stipulation.

Key Escrow

Not Supported.

Private Key Archival and Backup

Not supported.

CA Private Key Activation

The KCA key can be activiated by anyone with login access to the system and the private key's passphrase. That set is restricted to members of the Fermilab computer security team.

Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

End entity keys are not archived by the Fermilab PKI. CA keys are not archived beyond their validity period. The KCA key lifetime is three years.

Activation Data

The KCA key is not encrypted.

Computer Security Controls

The KCA runs on computer systems which are used only for Fermilab PKI operations, and which can be accessed only with physical presence or Kerberos network authentication and encryption.

Life Cycle Security Controls

No Stipulation

Network Security Controls

The KCA is behind Fermilab's network perimeter, subject to strict packet filtering and traffic monitoring for intrusion detection.

Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

No Stipulation

CERTIFICATE AND CRL PROFILES

Certificate Profiles

User Certificates

Subject:
DC=gov/DC=fnal/O=Fermilab/OU=People/CN=<Full Name>/UID=<acct>
Issuer:
DC=gov/DC=fnal/O=Fermilab/OU=Certificate Authorities/CN=Kerberized CA
Validity:
(depends on lifetime of Kerberos ticket presented)
Subject Public Key Info:
(provided by applicant - minimum RSA length is 512 bits)
X509v3 Extensions
SubjectAltName:
Other Name:
Kerberos Principal:<principal>
Email:<acct>@fnal.gov
Basic Constraints (critical):
CA:false
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier
...
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier
...
Key Usage (critical):
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
Netscape Cert Type:
SSL Client, SSL Server, S/MIME, Object Signing
Netscape CA Policy URL:
http://security.fnal.gov/pki/FNAL-Cert-Pol-KCA.pdf -- Not sure of URL
Netscape Comment:
"User certificate issued by Fermilab Kerberos-based CA"

<acct> represents the first component of the user's Kerberos principal name. <Full Name> is obtained from Fermilab personnel, visitor and contract records.

Certificate Policy Object Identifier

iso(1) org(3) dod(6) iana(1) private(4) enterprises(1) Fermilab(14147) security(1) documents(5) CPS(1).

CRL Profile

The CRL is in version 1 format.

SPECIFICATION ADMINISTRATION

Specification Change Procedures

Peer PKI operators will be notified of changes.

Publication

The policy will be available at http://computing.fnal.gov/security/pki/.

CPS Approval Procedures

The Fermilab computer security team approves practices compliant with this policy and statement.

For assistance contact helpdesk@fnal.gov.
Information compiled and maintained by Computer Security Team ; last modified by CST Oct, 2005.
(Address comments about page to the Computer Security Team.)